Playing into China’s hands in Ladakh

 

By Ajai Shukla

Business Standard, 7th Aug 20

 

In a statement posted on its website, which was withdrawn on Thursday afternoon, the Ministry of Defence (MoD) belatedly admitted what the government has stoutly denied so far: That Chinese troops had “transgressed” the Line of Actual Control (LAC) – the de facto Sino-Indian border – in several sectors in May, and that “the present standoff is likely to be prolonged.” That leaves the government with a simple question: Will those responsible be called to account?

 

India has never been hot on accountability for national security lapses. After the 1962 drubbing at the hands of China that killed 3,250 Indian soldiers, then prime minister Jawaharlal Nehru tried to shield his defence minister, VK Krishna Menon. After the Kargil conflict in 1999, when 522 Indian soldiers gave up their lives to evict Pakistani troops who had infiltrated across the Line of Control (LoC), a single brigadier was held responsible for intelligence and operational lapses that surely originated several levels above that unfortunate scapegoat. So it may be unrealistic to expect accountability for a situation that the government has acknowledged three months late, and through clenched teeth. Hope of accountability lies only in reports that Prime Minister Narendra Modi has quietly made his displeasure clear at the handling of matters by National Security Advisor (NSA) Ajit Doval and Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) General Bipin Rawat. More visible actions, such as sackings or transfers, have been avoided since those might constitute a public acceptance of mismanagement.

 

However, it is worth recounting events as they played out over the last four months in Eastern Ladakh. In mid-April, Indian satellite imagery detected, and signals and human intelligence corroborated, a Chinese military exercise across the LAC involving thousands of People’s Liberation Army (PLA) troops. In normal circumstances, the Indian Army too would have already moved a couple of reserve brigades (each with about 2,500 soldiers) to the LAC, ostensibly for “training” and “operational alert”, but equally to deter China from taking advantage of the springtime thaw and crossing over high-altitude passes on the LAC into Indian territory. However, someone had decided – and this fateful decision could only have come from New Delhi – that Covid-19 was a greater threat than the PLA. The traditional move of reserve formations to Ladakh had been called off this year, leaving the field clear for the PLA.

 

According to insider reports, intelligence gathering, especially of satellite intelligence left much to be desired, with planners having to fall back on commercial satellite imagery. Within the Defence Intelligence Agency – a tri-services organisation directly under the CDS – there was no cross verification of satellite imagery obtained from various sources and of signal intercepts. There were equal failures in intelligence analysis. In the National Security Council Secretariat (NSCS), which functions under the NSA, there was little coordination between military technical intelligence and that obtained by the four civilian agencies: the National Technical Research Organisation, the Intelligence Bureau, Research & Analysis Wing and the Ministry of Home Affairs through the Indo-Tibetan Border Police. Although the NSCS received a steady flow of intelligence from mid-April onwards, it failed to assess the PLA’s intentions to cross the LAC on multiple fronts.

 

Even so, the picture should have become clear on May 5, when an outnumbered Indian patrol was roughed up by hundreds of Chinese soldiers at Patrolling Point 14 on the Indian side of the LAC in the Galwan valley. Simultaneously, PLA intrusions were detected in the Hot Springs sector. Yet, the NSA confined his reaction to a pro-forma protest phone call to Beijing.

 

Over the following days, intelligence warnings poured in about likely Chinese intrusions across the LAC, from the Depsang Plain in Northern Ladakh to Naku La in Sikkim. Yet, on May 9, the government appeared to have been taken by surprise when Chinese soldiers crossed the settled international boundary at Naku La, Sikkim. The CDS and NSA reportedly told the PM that the transgressions were isolated incidents that would resolve themselves. This complacency continued through May 12, when two PLA helicopters chased an Indian chopper carrying a commanding general across the Pangong Tso lake.

 

The crisis was acknowledged only on May 17/18^th, when a PLA horde crossed eight kilometres into Indian territory on the north bank of Pangong Tso, and badly beat up and hospitalized 72 Indian soldiers. Planning finally began in earnest at the 14 Corps headquarters in Leh, with one senior officer describing the mood thus: “It was Kargil redux; everyone was like, is this really happening?”

 

Four days later, on May 22, army chief, General MM Naravane visited Leh. On May 24, orders were passed for reinforcements to Eastern Ladakh. Almost three weeks had elapsed since the first clash at Galwan. But even now, party spokespersons, establishment-friendly generals and the memorably named “godi media” continued insisting on TV debates and op-ed pieces that all was well.

 

While Indian reinforcements moved up to Ladakh, the NSA, the foreign minister and India’s ambassador in Beijing engaged the Chinese in talks. Beijing’s stance was clear: India was the aggressor and New Delhi had revealed that last August, when Home Minister Amit Shah told Parliament that Aksai Chin belonged to India. Beijing had not hidden its ire then: Besides voicing strong objections, Chinese troops had crossed the LAC at Pangong on September 11, 2019 and beaten up 10 Indian soldiers and damaged three Indian patrol boats.

 

With diplomatic engagement faltering, senior army commanders from both sides met on June 6 to discuss disengagement at Galwan. The Chinese proposed “mutual disengagement” and creating “buffer zones” – a formula that favours the aggressor since it is based on the status quo, rather than on the status quo ante. Through these discussions, the CDS and NSA remained passive, apparently still hoping that the Chinese would relent and return. Only on June 15, when Chinese soldiers ambushed and killed 20 Indian soldiers who had gone to the LAC to verify disengagement, did the situation’s seriousness dawn on our security elites. 

 

Even then, the government continued to obfuscate. On June 19, the foreign minister downplayed the intrusions while briefing an all-party meeting. The defence minister denied any intelligence failure. At the end, in a nationally televised statement, the prime minister denied any Chinese intrusions in Galwan. Insiders say it was on the advice of NSA and CDS. By many accounts, the PM has lost faith in the NSA and the CDS for over a month now, preferring the advice of political and intelligence officials who have so far proven correct in their assessments.

 

If the Chinese continue refusing to pull back in Depsang and Pangong Tso, as seems likely, and stick to the disengagement positions in Galwan and Hot Springs, they would have forcibly created a new LAC, with India having lost several hundred square kilometres of territory. Were New Delhi to acquiesce in this humiliation, it would not just be a blow to national prestige but also set the tone for a subservient relationship with Beijing, along with its cat’s paw, Pakistan. That will be unacceptable to the Indian people. It must also be unacceptable to the government.