Keith
Webster handled US-India defence relations for several years as a senior Pentagon
official in the Obama administration. Now a Senior Vice President with the US-India
Strategic Partnership Forum (USISPF), he talks to Ajai Shukla about the
trajectory of the defence relationship.
Q. Why has
the US designated India as a “major defence partner” (MDF)?
In the US system, this was a very significant
step. In May 2016, during the waning months of [former President Barack] Obama’s
administration, we began debating in the Pentagon the need to cement the solid
defence relationship we had achieved. We decided the best way to “immortalise”
the relationship was to bring in the term “major defence partner” into the June
2016 joint statement between Prime Minister Narendra Modi and President Obama.
At a meeting with [Defence Secretary] Ash
Carter that was attended by every political appointee in the Pentagon, I was
the only career official in that office. I told them: “In nine months, I will
probably be the only person here who will still be in this building (the
Pentagon). I need this relationship formalised.” We proposed the MDP
designation, and the Modi government accepted putting it into the [Modi-Obama]
joint statement.
Later in 2016, there was a short exchange
of letters between Ash Carter and [Defence Minister] Manohar Parrikar on what
MDP broadly meant. And then, MDP was mentioned in our National Defense
Authorization Act of 2017, signed by Barack Obama in December 2016. That means
the legislation is in place on the US side.
Q. What
does MDP mean in practical terms for India?
While both governments have acknowledged MDP,
we need to see how India defines it. When Secretary [Jim] Mattis returned from
India in September, he said: “We need to work on this definition [of MDP].” I
spoke to Secretary Tillerson about this when he was here in October. So the Trump
administration will flesh this out with the Modi government: what exactly will
MDP be?
Q. As a
MDP, where does India stand in the hierarchy of US defence partners?
The US has a pyramid of trust, based on
which we part with military capabilities and technologies. Naturally, the best
goes to the US military alone. Next, at the top of the pyramid are the allies
that fight alongside us the most. That would be the “Five Eyes” [an
intelligence-sharing alliance between the US, UK, Canada, Australia and New
Zealand]. One level below are the other allies who fight alongside us, which
comprises NATO – “Old NATO”, as opposed to “New NATO”. India hasn’t figured in
that pyramid of trust because we never fought as allies. But we are now friends.
So we have moved India up, policy-wise, to near the top of the pyramid. Not to
the pinnacle, but near the top of the pyramid.
Q. Below
the Five Eyes, but at par with older NATO members?
India’s status is consistent with members
of NATO, other than the Five Eyes.
Q. What
about the category of “major non-NATO allies” (MNNA), which the US has
designated Pakistan?
That status was unacceptable to India
because there are 15-16 nations in that category, including Pakistan. We needed
to do something unique for India, which is more than what we’ve done for
Pakistan.
Q. Why
would India accept that its designation is above Pakistan’s in the hierarchy of
allies?
Because our actions will prove it. Look at
the F-16, the Block 70 as we call it now. That is well above your neighbour’s
F-16s. What we are proposing for India reflects its status… I don’t believe
Pakistan would be sold the F-16 Block 70.
Q. What
benefits does MDP provide India?
First, in transferring defence
capabilities, India will be on par with NATO allies. Second, when we talk about
“Make in India”, we can now transfer more critical technologies to Indian industries
than without MDP categorisation.
Q. Delhi worries
that the Trump administration will be more transactional and focused on defence
sales rather than a technology partnership…
In February this year, I too wondered: How
do we reconcile “Make America Great Again” and “Make in India”? The good news
is the Trump administration has reconciled that, specific to India. It fully backs
everything the Obama administration proposed to India, including the exhaustive
preparatory work been done on F-16 and F/A-18 “Make in India”.
The Heritage Foundation, which is close to
the Trump administration, wrote on why it makes sense to support “Make in
India” on the F-16, even though much of the supply would shift to India. The argument
was: “An F-16 line in India is better than shutting it down. If an Indian line
keeps twenty American suppliers in business, that’s better than zero.”
Q. Over
the last decade, the US has concluded a wave of arms sales worth over $15
billion. What do you think the next wave will consist of?
Hopefully, the F-16 and F/A-18. Realistically,
even one of those would be huge. It would be a huge symbolic gesture of trust. A
fighter aircraft is a power projection capability. Transport aircraft and
helicopters are great, but to take that next step – to trust America or not to
supply a power projection platform – and have the confidence that the US would
be there through its service life, it would be hugely symbolic.
Q. Would
there be negative repercussions if India chose not to buy a US fighter?
Not really, but there would be huge
disappointment. In the Pentagon I spent 30 per cent of my time on India, much
of it pre-positioning the government approvals needed for making the F-16 and
F/A-18 in India. We don’t normally do that. We normally require governments to request
for a [weapons] platform and then we make the release decisions.
Q. Would
you call the Quadrilateral a step towards an alliance?
I think it’s huge. This was discussed for
the past 3-4 years, and the fact that the Indian government has allowed this to
be publicly discussed, no matter how it’s presented, is a huge step for me.
Q. Is
militarizing the Quadrilateral through Malabar an essential next step?
It would be a good, positive next step. We
are not allies and, in our system, we have to have a reason for why we would
transfer cutting edge technology to anyone. With allies, there’s a reason. But
with India, what we have used to justify moving forward is cooperating on maritime
domain awareness, search and rescue, and humanitarian assistance and disaster
relief.
Q. The
co-development and co-manufacturing mantras; how are they going to work, given
the huge asymmetry between US and Indian defence industries?
Indian industry will have to learn how to:
crawl, walk, and then run. It has technology absorption challenges, as there
are with anyone that starts this journey. You have to start somewhere, build a
work force, build infrastructure… It’s not insurmountable.
Q. When
you talk co-development, you assume both sides have something concrete to bring
to the table. In the Indian case, this is not always so…
That is true today. But it’s possible five
or ten years from now. We don’t have to do co-development on Day One. You would
[first] do some co-assembly, co-production and then graduate to co-development.
Q. With
close cooperation happening in the Joint Working Group on aircraft carriers, will
the two navies be at the forefront of the defence partnership?
Yes, given the cooperation on aircraft
carriers and maritime domain awareness. Also the Indian Air Force, because they
fly [the C-17 and C-130 transport aircraft and will fly the Apache and Chinook
helicopters soon.
Q. Are
there no lines of convergence between the two armies? In India, the army is the
most important and influential service…
There is the M777 ultra-light howitzer
[that the Indian Army has bought]. Maybe some day the Indian army will have the
Javelin [anti-tank missile]. It is possible the Indian army gets some Apaches
[attack helicopters] from the second tranche that has been ordered. There is an
Apache Users Group globally that brings armies together. There are reports the
Indian army is seeking new armoured vehicles; maybe there are some
opportunities for cooperation there. I would argue there are promising lines of
cooperation with the Indian army too.
This talk of designations - MDP and so on - is a bit like the titles that the Brits used to dole out to the upper class Indian elite during the Raj to make them feel important.... Rai Bahadur, Khan Sahib and so on. In this case, as an MDP, we are supposed to be higher than Pakistan (always important to the Indians, who can not get over their P-complex) but lower than the fellow-White Anglo Saxon Protestant brotherhood of the US with the UK, Canada, Australia and N Zealand. How much more ridiculous can this get. It is of course very much in our interest to partner with the US and so we should; there are enough close ties and lets build on them further. But this business of designations makes us look live craven fools aching for status.
ReplyDeleteI disagree this has anything to do with whiteness. I don't know of any time post independence India has fought alongside the US. While the British for example have spent blood and treasure on American ventures.
Delete