The
Pakistan Military in Politics: Origins, Evolution, Consequences
by Ishtiaq Ahmed
Amaryllis, New Delhi: 2103
540 pages, Rupees 795/-
If you are
looking for that one authoritative book that tells you all about the Pakistan
military and its role in that country’s politics --- your search continues. Ishtiaq
Ahmed has flubbed the opportunity to slake rising global interest in Pakistan’s
most powerful institution as NATO draws down from Afghanistan next year.
Instead he has given us a turgid, inelegant, potted history of Pakistan that does
not deserve to be on the same bookshelf as the excellent theoretical studies of
Ayesha Jalal, Hassan-Askari Rizvi and Ayesha Siddiqa, or more recent historiographies
by General Pervez Musharraf (In the Line of Fire); Shuja Nawaz (Crossed
Swords); and Mark Mazzetti (The Way of the Knife).
The author apparently
has the credentials to write an engaging and informative book on Pakistan. Born
in Lahore around the time of partition, Professor Ishtiaq Ahmed now lives in
Sweden and teaches at Stockholm University. But he is clearly no expert on the
Pakistani military, and that shines through in glaring errors (Sample, Page 63:
Pakistan got six armoured divisions at partition. In fact, it got only one).
The book loses
the reader at the outset with a rambling academic discourse that stumbles
through the theoretical frameworks of Samuel Finer, Samuel Huntington, Jack
Nelson-Pallmeyer and Harold Lasswell to conclude (as tens of thousands of
students of civil-military relations have concluded before) that the weakness
of Pakistan’s polity and the relative modernity and strength of its military
led to the former being dominated by the latter. Revealingly, Ahmed cites Max
Weber’s observation that, in early Muslim society that lived by the sword, the
warrior class quickly dominated the trader class, to infer that the Pakistan
military’s primacy has historical, religious-cultural and social roots. Like
many of his countrymen, Ahmed masks the failure of his country’s politics with
the assertion of its warrior cult.
When the
reader emerges from this intellectual bludgeoning, she is launched into a
capsule of world history, apparently as a backdrop for the Pakistan military’s
gestation. Context is laudable, but the author’s effort to flag every major
global event results in a goulash of half-page sub-chapters with headings like
“The United States”, “The Atlantic Charter”, “A Vision of Collective Security”,
“Realism Replaces Liberal Idealism in US Foreign Policy” and “The Pakistan
Scheme”. This perverse sub-chapterisation continues irritatingly for the rest
of the book. Like when dancing with a far more energetic and insistent partner,
the hapless reader is twirled now in the direction of “General Ayub Cultivates
the Americans” (one page), and now toward “The Military and Internal Politics”
(five lines).
On the plus
side, the author does not shrink from evaluating the Pakistani military
critically. He notes, for example, the generals’ opportunism in taking credit
for winning control over one-third of Kashmir in the 1947-48 conflict, while
blaming the British for preventing the capture of the entire state. Ahmed also
treats sceptically the myth, propagated by the generals, that Pakistan handily
won the 1965 war. He is even-handed towards India, making mention of Gandhi’s
fast-unto-death to pressure Nehru and Patel to give Pakistan its share of Rs
550 million, which the departing British had left to be shared between the two
militaries.
The book revives
some interesting vignettes that otherwise tend to blur over time. Ahmed plays
back the editorial reaction to Ayub Khan’s military takeover in leading English
news daily, Dawn, which styles itself today as a liberal bastion. Welcoming the
coup in an editorial entitled “A Sane Revolution”, Dawn wrote: “There have been
many revolutions in the world… but this revolution of ours has been of a
different sort. A complete change of both system and regime has been brought
about without any strife or bitterness, and without disorganizing the normal
lives of citizens… this unique feat will perhaps stand out in history as a
shining testimony to the wisdom, humanity and large-hearted patriotism of the
architects of the new order.”
Those who
see this reaction as shockingly short sighted should remember that, in those
days, an entire school of renowned American political scientists was justifying
political interventionism by the militaries of post-colonial states. Lucian W
Pye argued in “Armies in the Process of Political Modernization” that militaries
in newly independent, post-colonial states had minimal stakes in existing
autocratic governing structures and were therefore well suited to spearhead the
charge to democracy! Hailing the military’s egalitarianism, Pye wrote that the
“practice of giving advancement on merit can encourage people, first, to see the
army as a just organization deserving of their loyalties, and then possibly, to
demand that the same form of justice reign throughout their society.”
On the
whole, the book works only as a Pakistan primer for someone who has not read or
studied the country in any detail. It gets worse as it proceeds, with the
penultimate chapter, “The Gory End of Osama bin Laden”, a poorly written
journalist’s account drawn from press reports rather than from any insight into
the military. The book finishes with an eminently avoidable chapter entitled
“Analysis and Conclusions”. Fortunately, only the very conscientious would get
that far.
Can we expect anything better from these people? :(
ReplyDeleteCommend you for going through a book which in your own analysis is badly written and structured.
ReplyDeleteFrankly I don't have the capability to punish myself in such a way :-)
He is correct in that the Army and Mujhids are highly respected in Pakistani Society and it is one of the reasons military rule is not only accepted but welcomed. It is something indians on the whole will never understand(jat sikhs may do).
ReplyDeleteIn indian society father wishes his son to be docile and to study. In Pakistan in general fathers love the sons who are wild and tough but correct. When our children are small we tell stories about warriors from the family, the clan, our area and off course the islamic heros. They are always warriors. This may not be the case in general in lahore/islamabad but the rest of the country breathes this air.
Dear Col,
ReplyDeleteI note that in the review, at para 4, you refer to the reader as "she". So who actually read the book for this review?
Regards,
@ Anonymous 18:22
ReplyDeleteIn today's gender-sensitive world, the reader is not always referred to as "he". Since it might well be a woman, "she" is increasingly used in such a context.
Raw13:
ReplyDeleteIf you knew anything about military history, you would know that Indians are the warriors, not the Porkistanis.
Raw13:
ReplyDeleteIt is true that Indian fathers encourage their sons to study. If one does not, he is a shitty father - porkistani or not. Education is the gateway to opportunity. I don't know about docile, though. I don't know how many times I've seen Indians beating the shit out of Porkistanis. If Porkistani fathers encourage their sons to be wild, they need to do a better job of it.
Comments like the one @raw13 wrote make me realize just how much the problems of that benighted country are because of the misplaced machismo and "mardaangi" of its so-called warriors (who have never won a single war, by the way). Poor little boys who have to grow up like that. No wonder they build nothing, destroy everything.
ReplyDelete--SRC